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LAOS

DATE 26 Jan 71 PAGE 12

THE WASHINGTON POST

CIA-Backed Laotians Said Entering China

By Michael Morrow

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VIENTIANE, Laos — United States intelligence operations include the sending of armed Laotian reconnaissance teams into China from northern Laos, sources here say. Teams are reported to have gone as far as 200 miles into China, dispatched from a secret CIA outpost 15 minutes' flying time north of the Laotian opium center at Houei Sai.

According to sources close to the Central Intelligence Agency, and confirmed by Western diplomatic sources in Vientiane, the CIA is sending out hill tribesmen armed with American weapons, a three-pound radio with a range of 400 miles and equipment to tap Chinese telegraph lines, watch roads and do other types of intelligence gathering.

"There is always a team in China," sources close to the CIA said.

Staging area for the operation is a small mountain valley airstrip called Nam Lieu (also known as Nam Yu). The strip, which one Air American pilot describes as "difficult as hell to get into," is surrounded by mountains. It is serviced by both Air America and Confidential Air Service, and is also a way-station for opium traders from northern Laos and Burma en route to drug factories at Houei Sai.

During 1968, five Chinese functionaries caught up in the purges of the Cultural Revolution defected to a Nam Lieu reconnaissance team. They were treated well by the Americans for a time but eventually were turned over to the Royal Laotian government.

According to sources close to the CIA, the five were thrown into a 12 by 12 by 12 foot pit exposed to the elements. They were eventually executed.

Like most CIA operations in Laos, the one out of Nam Lieu is directed from a headquarters at Udorn air base in northeastern Thailand. There are several Americans at Nam Lieu, including CIA and military intelligence personnel. Sources close to the CIA report the number has increased recently from four to more than 10.

In addition to activities inside China, the Nam Lieu Americans also help direct a joint operation of "SGU" (special guerrilla units) and the Thai army at Xieng Lom south of Houei Sai on the Lao-Thai border. They also run intelligence-gathering missions on a road being built by the Chinese government (under an agreement reached with the now-defunct coalition government of Laos) in the same vicinity.

Until mid-September of last year, the Nam Lieu operation was headed by a rough-and-tumble veteran guerrilla organizer named Anthony "Tony" Poe. Poe is a legendary figure in Laos known best for his dislike of journalists, disregard

for orders and radio codes, capacity for Lao whiskey and expertise at clandestine guerrilla operations.

Poe was removed almost immediately after an article last September by Dispatch News Service International on the Nam Lieu operations, ostensibly because the article "blew his cover." According to sources close to the CIA, however, this reason was an excuse used by the American embassy here to get rid of Poe, whose style has been a source of long-term friction with members of the American mission in Laos including Ambassador McMurtrie Godley.

The September story was reportedly a major concern of CIA Director Richard Helms when he visited Laos in the fall. Helms was quite upset that there might be a leak within the CIA in Laos sources close to the CIA report.

Whether by design or coincidence, Vince Shields, in charge of CIA operations at Long Cheng on the edge of the Plain of Jars north of Vientiane, and Patrick Devlin, station chief for the CIA in Vientiane, have both been transferred.

As for the mission into China, sources close to the CIA and Western diplomatic sources both report that to their knowledge the mission are continuing.

Since leaving Nam Lieu Poe has spent most of his time at Udorn air base, although one source reported that Poe continued to do "odd jobs" on the Thai-Cambodian border. Those who know him say he is unhappy away from Nam Lieu.

Poe is an ex-Marine noncommissioned officer, wounded at Iwo Jima, who remained in Asia after World War II. In the 1950s he helped organize CIA-trained Tibetan insurgents, escorting them to Colorado for training and going back with them into Tibet.

Late he worked in the Thai-Cambodian border area with the Khmer Serai, anti-Sihanouk guerrillas receiving assistance from the CIA, and other parts of Thailand. He has been in and out of Laos since before the Geneva Accords of 1962 and was one of the first Americans involved in arming and training paramilitary groups in Laos.

Poe is considered stubborn and brusque, sometimes going into fits of anger over the radio, his lifeline with the outside world. He is said to prefer working with hill tribes to working with Americans and looks down on most American operations because of their heavy reliance on American personnel.

He has been wounded at least once during his career in Laos, and reportedly a price has been put on his head by the Pathet Lao. He is perhaps the only American legally married to a woman of the hill tribes.

Chronology of U.S. Role

WASHINGTON, Feb. 8—Following is a chronology of events and decisions that marked the increasing United States involvement in Laos:

1954

JULY 21—Agreement was reached at Geneva conference to end Indochina war and establish Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam as independent, neutral countries. The United States took note of conference declaration but declined to sign.

1960

DEC. 31—After breakup of coalition Government threw Laos into three-way leftist-neutralist-rightist conflict. President Eisenhower asserted, "We cannot let Laos fall to the Communists even if we have to fight."

1961

APRIL 19—President Kennedy authorized dispatch of United States military assistance advisory group of about 300 to Laos.

1962

JULY 23—The United States was one of 14 nations to sign agreement in Geneva recognizing neutrality of Laos. The United States later withdrew more than 600 military men from mission in Laos. However, neutrality agreement was regularly violated by both sides.

1964

MAY 19—The United States began reconnaissance flights over southern Laos; after plane was shot down, armed escorts were sent.

1965

JANUARY—The United States disclosed it had started bombing Ho Chi Minh Trail. Later in the year the United States opened a "requirements office" staffed by retired military personnel to

supervise military aid to Laos and training of Laotians in neighboring Thailand. The extent of American involvement then was described in a series of articles in The New York Times Oct. 26-28, 1969. They disclosed that the United States was supplying training and directing a 40,000-man secret army of Meo hill tribesmen commanded by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao.

1970

March 6—President Nixon, explaining American involvement, said "air interdiction" and bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail were intended "to protect American and allied lives in Vietnam." He said no American ground troops were in Laos and none of 1,040 Americans stationed there, including 320 military advisers and 323 logistics personnel, had been killed.

1971

Jan. 19—Officials reported that American helicopter gunships were flying combat missions in direct support of Laotian ground troops, attacking enemy troops and supply convoys along Ho Chi Minh Trail. Other informants said B-52's, tactical fighter-bombers and specially outfitted reconnaissance aircraft were also being used. The United States reported that 13 helicopters had been lost since last March 10, 1970.

Feb. 5—After six days of a blackout on news, the United States command in Saigon announced that 9,000 American troops were supporting 20,000 South Vietnamese poised in northwestern South Vietnam to cross into Laos to attack enemy supply routes.

Dr. Roland Scott of Freedmen's Hospital tells what he has tried to accomplish in dealing with sickle cell anemia with a minimum of support during the past two decades. In an interview conducted in the Pediatrics Ward at the Howard University hospital, Dr. Scott tells of his dream for the establishment of a Center for the Study of Sickle Cell Anemia at the predominantly black university.

Dr. Scott also explains his views of the widely publicized urea treatment for sickle cell anemia victims and tells why he believes the so-called urea breakthrough may be considerably less important than its initial publicity indicated.

The program also includes conversations with a 16-year-old sickle cell anemia victim and his mother and a statement from Dr. Donald Fredrickson of the National Institutes of Health who describes the federal government's role in sickle cell anemia research.

The extent of Dr. Scott's activities at Howard is illustrated with footage taken in Hartford's North End where a former student of Dr. Scott, Dr. Evans Daniels, is now operating a non-profit health center.

"The Forgotten Disease—Sickle Cell Anemia" was filmed by Robert Dwyer and John Coates, with sound by Randy Scallie. It was directed by Roy Benjamin and produced by Rufus Coes and Richard Ahles.

COMMENT BY MR. PATRICELLI FOLLOWING SECOND SPECIAL PROGRAM ON SICKLE CELL ANEMIA, JANUARY 15TH

This is Leonard Patricelli: When we sent a documentary crew to Washington, we hoped they would find some answers to your questions about sickle cell anemia. We wanted to show you what was being accomplished at Howard University, where Dr. Roland Scott has been working on sickle cell anemia treatment and research for decades. And we hoped to find out what the federal government was doing about sickle cell anemia and what help it could provide the states, especially Connecticut.

At Howard University, we learned that Dr. Scott and his associates are severely limited by a lack of support from either public or private sources. However, we also discovered that Dr. Scott has a dream—a dream that may someday become the Center for the Study of Sickle Cell Anemia. Such a Center, as Dr. Scott told us in the program you just saw, would provide care for sickle cell anemia victims, extensive research facilities and a bureau of education which would disseminate knowledge of this terrible disease to the public and to physicians in every corner of the world.

At the National Institutes of Health, we found that the federal government was not really prepared to say what it could do about sickle cell anemia. However, at our request, the government has been researching the problem and within a few weeks, representatives of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare will come to Connecticut to meet with key legislative and health officials. This meeting should provide some specific answers.

We can also report some local progress. Eight weeks ago, in a WTIC editorial, we advocated a program of testing and counseling for sickle cell anemia. On the fifth of January, Hartford became the first city in America to authorize citywide testing of school children. The Board of Education plans to begin voluntary sickle cell anemia tests in the schools this spring.

In other words, this program on sickle cell anemia is the last we will be able to entitle "The Forgotten Disease." It's beginning to look as if there is a growing awareness of this disease and a growing desire to do something about it.

In November, when we first broadcast an editorial on sickle cell anemia, we promised

that it wouldn't be the last you would hear of the disease. Tonight, we have another promise. This is not the last you will hear of Dr. Scott's dream of a Center for Sickle Cell Anemia.

SEIZURE OF AMERICAN TUNA BOATS

HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 9, 1971

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, the recent seizure of American tuna boats by Ecuador points up the real need for a change in U.S. policy toward our territorial seas. Such incidents occur all too regularly, and they will continue as long as a double standard governs the law of the open sea. For too long, our friends and enemies have taken advantage of our generous 3- and 12-mile claims without returning the favor to American vessels. Ecuador, for example, used American-built destroyers to enforce its extravagant 200-mile limit; an irony which I do not find particularly humorous.

The historic rule of thumb among maritime nations has been that a country's territorial rights extend 3 miles seaward; the 3 miles representing the effective range of a 17th century onshore cannon. The United States continues to adhere to this traditional limit for navigational purposes, while claiming a 12-mile boundary for fishing rights. Both claims, I might add, are eminently reasonable when compared with those of most other nations.

But times have changed, Mr. Speaker. The 3-mile limit no longer guarantees our security, leaving us open to numerous forms of electronic surveillance and enemy espionage. The 12-mile limit no longer protects the rights of our fishermen against nations claiming 200-mile jurisdictions. And the entire situation merely perpetuates the inequity of the double standard which governs our international waters.

The joint resolution I introduced today calls for an international conference to resolve the debate over territorial seas. The need for such a panel should be obvious.

More important, however, my legislation would establish an American policy of reciprocity with regard to other nations. It would impose the same limits in U.S. waters on the ships of any country which itself claimed limits beyond what are considered to be normal under international agreement. Thus, Russian or North Korea ships would be allowed only within 12 miles of our shore, whether fishing or cruising; Ecuadorian vessels would be restricted from areas within 200 miles of the coast. It seems time, Mr. Speaker, that we ask other nations to observe the same stringent rules we impose upon ourselves—or suffer the consequences.

The joint resolution I am introducing is identical to the one I offered at this time last year; only the circumstances are more urgent, and they demand immediate action by the Congress.

REPRESENTATIVE MOORHEAD URGES LAOS REAR GUARD

HON. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 9, 1971

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Speaker, like many of my colleagues, I am disturbed by the most recent military incursion into Laos by the South Vietnamese Army.

With so little information available, it is hard to make accurate observations. But from what is known, I have my doubts about the total worth of this venture.

Let us, for the moment, set aside the congressional restraints embodied in the Cooper-Church language. I say this because the administration takes no heed from Congress, or else makes so literal an interpretation of the provision that Cooper-Church is all but negated.

What angers me is that I have a strong feeling that the rationale behind the Laos adventure springs from belief that the United States can bring a military end to the Indochina war.

Our Nation, according to the President, is pledged to a political settlement in Indochina. I think we should begin putting flesh to those words.

Last year, I introduced a resolution that resolved "that no funds in fiscal year 1971 be used to finance the operation of any American combat or support troops in Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand." Needless to say, passage of this resolution would have precluded what is now happening in Laos.

I plan to reintroduce similar language with an appropriate updating of fiscal year limitations.

An editorial in today's Washington Post is a very accurate account of the way I feel about the Lao activity.

At this time, I would like to put this editorial into the Record and urge all of my colleagues, who have not yet done so, to read this editorial and then ask themselves, What are we doing assisting an invasion of Laos?

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 9, 1971]

LAOS: REAR GUARD OR THIRD FRONT?

When the President came up with his Cambodian surprise last Spring, we were told that it was indispensable to our success in Vietnam, and that it would be as decisive as, let's say, Stalingrad or D-Day, and that we had bought a year's time or more in terms of disruption of enemy infiltration and destruction of supplies. Now, of course, we are hearing precisely the same things about the foray against the Laotian access routes—that this, too, will be decisive because the Laotian trails are all that remains of the enemy's lifeline to the South. This is the genuinely disquieting aspect of this latest Vietnam adventure, the sense that the Administration really believes it is doing something decisive—that this is it. It is the irrefragable tendency to oversell that shakes the faith of even those war critics who would like to accept the administration's scenario—the phased withdrawal, the irreversible process of Vietnamization, the skillful buying of time and all the rest.

But it isn't only the oversell; it is also the wrong sell; the South Vietnamese plunge into Laos could hardly have been presented with

its regard for public and congressional sensitivities. First there were the futile efforts at secrecy which only fanned the darkest speculations; then there were the incomprehensible speculations from responsible officials themselves. It was almost as if the administration had gone out of its way for ten days to conjure up the worst in order to make the real thing more palatable—which might not have been a bad tactic were it not for its effect upon public faith in the real thing when it finally materialized.

The real thing, as far as we can gather, is a South Vietnamese sweep through the Laotian access routes, strongly supported by American air and logistics, but not by organized U.S. combat units. It is supposedly intended to impede the infiltration flow, if not to stop it, until the rains come in the early Spring. This, in turn, would materially affect the capacity of the enemy to operate much further South in Cambodia and South Vietnam during the late Spring months—until the monsoon season reaches that region in June. And so you buy not two months, but maybe eight or ten, and Vietnamization proceeds apace. It makes some sense, if you believe that Vietnamization will proceed; it then can reasonably be said to advance in a very positive way our prospects for a continued, orderly, even accelerated withdrawal from the war.

But it still isn't Stalingrad. It isn't intended—allegedly—to win the war—only to facilitate our disengagement from it. And it may not even do that, because the South Vietnamese could get badly mauled; or the repercussions could bring down the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma in Laos with who knows what consequences; or the North Vietnamese could react in the way they have reacted to every significant alteration of the ground rules on our part; they could come with one of their own. This is what has always bedeviled Vietnam—the unforeseen consequence. Last April 30, Cambodia was suddenly critical to everything—whereas it hadn't been worth more than a phrase in a definitive war report by the President ten days earlier. A month or so ago, who was saying that Laos was suddenly the key to it all? And what is there to say that next month it may not be a North Vietnamese build-up across the top of the Demilitarized Zone—or the beginnings of heavy infiltration down through the DMZ—which will be said to oblige us to embark on yet another, final, definitive military adventure beyond South Vietnam's borders for the sake of the safe withdrawal of our troops?

This is the sort of hard question to which we hear no answers from the men in charge. And this also is the sort of grim possibility that is once again causing some war critics to warn anew of an "expanded war" and to charge violations of the Cooper-Church restraints and to threaten, with some good reason, further congressional efforts to stay the President's hand. For they cannot find, either in the record or some of the rhetoric, much reassurance that this is in fact a strictly limited rear guard maneuver and not the opening of a third war front. And neither, as far as that goes, can we.

STOP BEING FUNNY

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 9, 1971

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, the obvious public opposition to heavy taxation and an ineffective use of Federal moneys at all levels of government is

properly emphasized in an editorial Saturday, January 30, in the Polish American—Chicago.

I believe it is pertinent, Mr. Speaker, for us to recognize that this logical public frustration with taxation is directed at all levels of government and under no circumstances will duplication of effort, waste, or unneeded government spending be tolerated. The editorial follows:

STOP BEING FUNNY

The old saying that "people are funny" was never truer than it is today. Never were there so many millions asking for public charity doled out to them under a pleasing variety of titles. We overlook the fact that government has no money to give that it does not first take from its citizens in taxes, or higher and higher public debt. The latter today requires the payment of over \$20 billion a year in interest charges alone.

No matter what the government, federal, state or local is giving you, don't think you are not paying for it. We are paying for exorbitant government spending and debt in inflated prices and the reduced value and buying power of the dollar. We are paying for it in everything we eat, wear and use. The amount of taxes withheld from the average income would have paid for a home not so long ago. What used to be put into savings, now goes to the tax collector, and the one who earned it never sees it.

The people will have to stop being "funny" if they wish to save their bacon in the U.S. Your savings and your government are being destroyed by those who put politics ahead of fiscal responsibility.

FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING

HON. LOUIS FREY, JR.

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 9, 1971

Mr. FREY. Mr. Speaker, I think it is important to note that the White House does not believe it has erred in its proposal for sharing Federal revenues with the States and local governments.

Too often in the course of our history there has been validity in charges that an administration has erred in judgment or in fact when presenting an important program and, as a result, those charges have gone unchallenged.

But today, we see the President and the White House fully confident that they are right and fully prepared to meet the challenge, from whatever source, when their basic premises are questioned.

May I repeat here today what Presidential Assistant John Ehrlichman said recently, because it is important that the facts be iterated constantly so that both the Congress and the people can judge revenue sharing on its merits.

Mr. Ehrlichman said:

We are not going to raise taxes or cut existing programs. It is not true that some cities and States will receive less money under the Administration proposal. It is true that some will receive more.

Governors, county executives, and mayors should all be aware of this and, being aware, should support the program wholeheartedly. It is, I believe, their salvation.

THE VICTIMS OF CRIME

HON. WILLIAM J. GREEN

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 9, 1971

Mr. GREEN of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing a bill that I believe will indicate to the victims of violent crime, to their relatives and to their friends, that government is concerned about them and compassionately interested in their lives.

Crime is never neutral in its effects. Yet, the reaction of society to crime has generally been to focus less on the victim and more on the enforcement agencies and the criminal. In this country, we have a system of well developed criminal procedures. We take seriously the dictum that rights of all must be protected. We insist on correct rules of evidence. We demand of our court prosecutors and enforcement personnel fairness and restraint in the kinds of investigative and judicial methods utilized to secure justice.

We have provided our law enforcement agencies with new powers and new sources of money. We have increased the size of enforcement training and education programs. We have provided funding for updating police communications through the use of on-line computers and information networks. Police salaries are increasing. We certainly have not solved all the court and enforcement problems. There is a heavy backlog in our courts. We still have too few judges and prosecutors. We still have not reconciled the role of the policeman in our changing society nor have we taken adequate measures of the problems of the police in relation to the kinds of duties they are called on to perform. Their problems are ongoing and we must continue to seek answers to them.

But, in all of our efforts at criminal justice, one omission is glaring and overpowering—we have not considered with the same dedication and sensitivity the third sector of any criminal act—the victim. The victim of violent crime has become the "forgotten victim." His plight and suffering have too often been dismissed as the unfortunate byproduct of violent attacks.

Yet, if government has the obligation to protect its citizens, if it has the obligation to provide enforcement assistance, if it has responsibility for public safety, so too does it have the obligation to help and care for the innocent it fails to protect.

To do less is to abrogate and make null the very heart of the relationship between a citizen and his government.

As an idea and concept, crime compensation is hardly novel. Several foreign countries and a small number of American States already have crime compensation legislation. California, New York, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Hawaii, presently have ongoing programs. New York, for example, in its crime compensation policy notes that "many innocent persons suffer personal physical injury or death as a result of criminal acts. Such persons or their de-